Security
@gent lets a coding agent read and change files on your computer. Access to your Gmail account grants access to that computer.
Report a problem
Email support@thecompound.tech with "Security" in the subject. Describe the problem and how to reproduce it. Do not include live credentials or private task text. Do not post it publicly before a fix ships.
Fixes ship in the latest release on PyPI. Older releases are not patched. The changelog lists each release.
What the runner trusts
- Only mail in your authenticated Gmail Sent folder can start a task or answer an approval. Anyone who can add mail to that folder has the same power. Protect your Gmail account and app password.
- The runner reads secrets at run time from your keychain or environment. It never writes secrets to the config. Before starting an agent, the runner removes inherited provider API keys and its own password variable.
- An agent runs as your user. A project folder is not a security boundary. Claude Code gets no OS sandbox. Codex keeps its configured sandbox.
- Attachments are untrusted. The runner gives them safe names and private permissions. It never unzips or runs them.
- OAuth refresh tokens go to the macOS Keychain or Linux secret-tool. The runner treats them like mailbox passwords.
How it works describes the design in more detail.